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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
CARLOS MAURICE HEARON : Case No. 20020263-CA 
Defendants/Appellants : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT, 
SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
TRANSIENT AND EVIDENCE THAT HIS CHILDREN HAD 
BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS HOME? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was preserved for appeal by objection of 
counsel (R. 074/ pg 69 on the DCFS issue, and R. 074/ pg 70 on the homeless 
issue) The standard of review is "Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion." See State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999), 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). However, "admission of prior crimes evidence 
1 
itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of that 
discretion." (Id) In other words, failure of a trial court to undertake a scrupulous 
examination in connection with the admission of prior bad act evidence constitutes 
an abuse of discretion." State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah App 2000) 
"We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior crimes or other 
bad acts under an abuse of discretion standard." State v.Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 
(Utah 2001); State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 
1164 (2000). "However, in the proper exercise of that discretion, trial judges must 
scrupulously examine the evidence before it is admitted." State v. Widdison, 28 
P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001) (quoting Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999)." State v. 
Bisner, 37 P.3d 1073 (Utah 2001). 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT, SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE REGARDING AN 
ALLEGED THEFT OF A MUSTANG VEHICLE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for 
appeal(R. 074/ pg 6,12,14,31,37,39,83,91), although after several references 
defense counsel finally objected (R. 074/ pg 78) therefore the plain error standard 
applies. "To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact 
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
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harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
POINT III 
DID THE ELICITATION OF OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 
AND THE COMMENTING ON THAT EVIDENCE DURING 
OPENING AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS CONSTITUTE 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not fully and properly preserved for 
appeal, and therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a 
defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT 
App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). "In order to demonstrate 
prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that "'the actions or remarks of.. 
counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in 
considering in determining its verdict." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See 
also State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000)(quoting State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 
925, 928 (Utah Ct.App. 1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
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(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from 
a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, 
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
4 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements 
ofRules402and403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant is charged in a single count information dated December 7, 
2001 with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). On December 7, 2001, 
the defendant made an initial appearance and the information was read. On 
December 18, 2001, the defendant waived his preliminary hearing and the matter 
was set for trial for February 12, 2002. The defense moved to continue the trial 
and a jury trial was held on May 31, 2002 with the Honorable Judge Roger S. 
Dutson presiding. 
After a one day jury trial, the jury returned with a guilty verdict, and on July 
9, 2002, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed 
five years in the Utah State Prison. The prison term was suspended and the 
defendant was placed on probation with a jail term of 180 days with credit for time 
served, as a condition of probation. The defendant began his 180-day jail term on 
July 29, 2002. 
This judgment and conviction was entered on July 11, 2002 and the 
defendant filed his notice of appeal on August 9,2002. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). At trial the prosecutor elicited 
testimony from Officer Jeff Pickrell that he arrested the defendant on an 
outstanding traffic warrant. (R.074/pgl6) Officer Pickrell then transported the 
defendant to the Weber County Jail and searched him. (R. 074/ pg 22) During the 
search the officer found a "small plastic baggie with white residue" in the 
defendant's right front pocket. (R. 074/ pg 23) The officer asked the defendant 
about this and the defendant told him "it looked like meth, but it was not his." (R. 
074/ pg 23) The evidence was seized and taken to the State Crime Lab where it 
was analyzed by Julianna Taylor a criminalist. Julianna Taylor took the baggie 
which "just had residue in it" and 'rinsed it out with methanol and ran it on the 
GCMS." (R. 074/ pg 56) The residue tested positive for methamphetamine. (R. 
074/pg58). 
The only real issue before the jury was whether the defendant knowingly 
possessed the methamphetamine. The defense called as its sole witness Sherry 
Richards who testified that she had gone through every pocket of his pants looking 
for money the morning of the arrest and search and did not see the baggie.(R. 074/ 
pgs 65-67) She also testified that she observed a search of the defendant by the 
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police prior to transportation to the jail in which the baggie was not found. (R. 074/ 
pgs 68,69) Neither officer recalled whether or not such a search had occurred. 
The testimony and argument at trial was relatively short (87 pages) and was 
completed in less than a day. During the course of the trial the state made 
numerous references to other bad acts of the defendant. Beginning in the 
prosecutors opening statement, references were made to the defendant having 
knowledge of a stolen Mustang vehicle (R. 074/ pg 6) and that the defendant was 
at the offices of Child Welfare. (R. 074/ pg 7) During the testimony of the state's 
first witness, Officer Pickrell, reference was again made to the stolen Mustang and 
that the officer was "looking for Carlos Hearon to talk with about [the]case." (R. 
074/ pgl2) The victim of the Mustang theft had notified the police that he had 
seen the defendant. (R. 074/ pg 13) and the officer testified that he "was looking 
for Mr. Hearon." (R. 074/ pg 13) The officer first makes contact with the 
defendant at the DCFS parking lot. (R. 074/ pg 14)The defendant was never 
charged with automobile theft (R. 074/ pg31) 
The state's second witness was Officer Derek Draper. He testified, among 
other things, that "there was a report of a possible suspect (the defendant)" in the 
Mustang theft case. (R. 074/ pg 37) That the suspect was at "900 Capitol... around 
that area at that (DCFS) building." (R. 074/ pg 37) He was told to "just go and stop 
the suspect" and that that suspect was the defendant. (R. 074/ pg 37) He stopped 
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the defendant and told him that "you match the description in this case and another 
officer needs to talk to you" (R. 074/ pg 38) Officer Draper further testified that 
Officer Pickrell told him to go retrieve the Mustang, (R. 074/ pg 39) and that he 
"detained the suspect." (R. 074/ pg 39) He then "left to find the car that was in 
question," and then "CSI arrived, processed the vehicle, took some photos and 
stuff of that nature"(R. 074/ pg 41) On cross examination he testified that he 
released the car to the owner. (R. 074/ pg 41) 
The defendant's sole witness, Sherry Richards, testified that she and the 
defendant went to DCFS for an appointment. (R. 074/ pg 67) The first question 
from the prosecutor on cross-examination was "[What] was the reason for the trip 
to DCFS?" (R. 074/ pg 69) and next, "Where were [the children]?" to which the 
witness answered "They were in State's custody." (R. 074/ pg 69) Defense counsel 
immediately objected and the judge sustained. The next question was "You said 
that you'd gone to DCFS from the Stonehedge apartments in Layton City."(R. 074/ 
pg 70) Then the prosecutor asked "And, in fact, wasn't Carlos essentially transient 
or homeless at the time?" to which the defense objected. Apparently the judge 
overruled the objection at a sidebar conference since the next question was "Isn't it 
true that he was essentially transient, homeless?"(R. 074/ pg 70) Shortly thereafter, 
the prosecutor asked "What car was it you took into Ogden?"(R. 074/ pg 74) and 
then inquired as to the witness and the defendant parking the car over 2 Vi blocks 
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from the DCFS building.(R. 074/ pgs 74,75) The prosecutor ask "But you didn't 
park at DCFS did you?".(R. 074/ pg 75) He further inquired "[T]hey've got 
parking at the DCFS building, don't they?" and "But you chose not to use the 
parking lot?"(R. 074/ pg 78) The prosecutor later asked "In fact, the vehicle was 
registered to somebody else" and "In fact the title was held by somebody else 
wasn't it?" (R. 074/ pg 78) At this point, defense counsel objected, and apparently 
the judge sustained the objection without comment to the jury. 
During closing argument the prosecutor stated "In fact, they're out there 
because they're investigating this dispute about the 1989 Ford Mustang report of 
auto theft," and that officer Draper was asked to "detain the defendant there in the 
area of DCFS." The officer told the defendant "I just need to talk to you for a 
minute." (R. 074/ pg 83) He then stated "And the father or the mother of the 
children is inside DCFS at that time having a visit with their children." He goes 
on with the statement "in talking to him about the car ... he found out that [the 
defendant] had a warrant for his arrest." 
Defense counsel then spends almost half of his closing argument trying to 
explain away the car theft problem.(R. 074/ pgs 85-87) 
In his rebuttal, the prosecutor again gratuitously mentions DCFS (R. 074/ pg 
88) and then, referring to the testimony of Sherry Richards, asks the jury "and let's 
see what we can infer about her testimony there."(R. 074/ pg 91) "They don't park 
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at the DCFS building; they park a block and a half, two blocks away at least.", 
"And they're there for a visit with the children." (R. 074/ pg 91) Finally, in 
response to the prosecutors statement "And during that time she's supposedly 
having her visit with her children there at DCFS" defense counsel objects. The 
judge overrules the objection.(R. 074/ pg 92) 
The jury then finds the defendant guilty of the offense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The case on trial was uncomplicated. The State was required to establish, 
beyond a reasonable doubt three basic elements of the offense as follows: The 
defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) possessed, (3) a controlled 
substance.1 For purposes of this appeal, the defendant concedes that the evidence is 
sufficient with regards to elements 2 and 3, in that the testimony is undisputed that 
the baggie of residue was found on the defendant, and the residue was 
methamphetamine. The only real issue was the intent or knowledge of the 
defendant regarding the drug possession. Did the defendant intend to possess the 
baggie of residue, or did he know that the baggie was in his pocket. The errors at 
trial consist of numerous references to irrelevant facts that resulted in the improper 
prejudice of the jury toward the defendant. The prosecution intentionally and 
repeatedly put on evidence inferring that the defendant was a suspect in a theft of a 
1
 Jurisdiction and identity of the defendant were not an issue at trial, nor are they at issue in this appeal. 
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Ford Mustang, despite the fact that the original stop was not at issue. The search 
was incident to the arrest on the outstanding traffic warrant, and therefore proper. 
The prosecutor asked numerous questions and made statements inferring that the 
defendant was a bad or abusive parent since DCFS had removed his children from 
his home, and inferring he was an undesirable person because he was transient. 
None of these facts, even if they were true, had any probative value to the elements 
of the offense, or to any defense propounded by the defendant. The only logical 
explanation as to why the prosecutor repeatedly referred to these things is to bias 
or prejudice the jury against the defendant in order to overcome the weakness in 
his case with regard to mens rea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT, 
SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
TRANSIENT AND EVIDENCE THAT HIS CHILDREN HAD 
BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS HOME? 
During the course of the trial, the prosecutor put on evidence that the 
defendant was transient and that his children had been removed from the home, 
and that he and the mother were visiting with the children at the Division of Child 
and Family Services (DCFS) facility. These areas of inquiry were objected to by 
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the defense, and the trial court, without making any findings, determined that both 
areas of inquiry would be allowed into evidence2. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of evidence provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of 402 and 403. 
The evidence in question was presumably introduced for the purpose of 
showing foundation, however, the trial court made his rulings at sidebar 
conferences, or with no explanation, and therefore no record of this analysis was 
preserved. 
The Supreme Court has struggled with the rule of other crime evidence 
under Rule 404(b) in recent years. The Court in 1997 issued the opinion of State v. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) and then in 1999 issued the opinion of State v. 
Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in which they reassessed and to some extent 
overruled Doporto. 
In the case of State v. Decorso, the Court held "admission of prior crimes 
evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper 
2
 The defense originally objected to the inquiry as to the state custody of the children which 
was sustained by the trial court,(R. 074/ pg 70) Later the court overruled the defense 
objection allowing the prosecutor to comment on this issue. (R. 074/ pg 91,92) 
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exercise of that discretion." {Id at 843) The court then described the required two-
pronged analysis the trial court must utilize in making a ruling on this issue. First, 
the trial court must determine whether the evidence is being offered for a proper 
non-character purpose. Second, the trial court must determine whether the 
evidence tends to prove some fact material to the crime charged, and whether its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. {Id at 
843,844) (see also State v. Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210, 1226 (Utah 2002) where the court 
held: Other crime evidence is admissible if it "tends to prove some fact that is 
material to the crime charged — other than the defendant's propensity to commit 
crime." DeCorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999). The court further held "although the 
contested evidence in DeCorso was evidence of a prior crime, the acts here appear 
to have been perfectly lawful, whereas we find the reasoning of that case 
applicable and persuasive.") 
Further, the court must also make a balancing determination as required 
under rule 403. In the case of State v. Bluff 52 P.3d 1210, 1227 (Utah 2002) the 
Court described this process: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of 
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as 
to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to 
which the evidence will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
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In the present case, the trial court did none of this. Conceivably it could be 
argued that the State offered the evidence for foundation purposes. The problem is 
that foundation is not one of the listed non-character purposes in 404(b). If this 
Court determines that foundation falls within the parameters of "other purposes", 
there still exists the problem that the record is absolutely devoid of any analysis 
under Rule 403 of the prejudicial effect that this evidence would have on the 
defendant in the minds of the jury. Such an analysis is required both under Rule 
404(b) as well as by State v. Decorso and its progeny. 
In the present case, there can be no argument that the evidence was offered 
for purposes of "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." ( URE Rule 404(b)) The fact that the 
defendant went to the offices of DCFS is useless to the jury on those purposes. 
Neither does the transient or homeless status of the defendant assist the jury in 
deciding any element of the offense or purposes behind such elements. The only 
effect that this evidence had on the jury was to bias the jury toward the defendant. 
The fact that this information is gratuitously brought to the attention of the jury on 
numerous occasions including eight (8) separate references to DCFS in closing 
3
 See also State v.Colwell 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000) where the Prosecution committed error 
in inquiring into the particulars of the defendant's previous convictions which were 
divulged in his direct examination. 
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argument alone4, suggests the improper motive of the prosecutor to bias the jury 
against the defendant with these statements5. 
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to properly preserve these 
issues for appeal, this Court would then review these prejudicial statements under a 
plain error standard. In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 
1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not reverse unless 
we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both obvious and 
harmful". The Court further ruled "An error is harmful if the likelihood of a 
different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (Id. at 
1010J. This Court, in the case of State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 
1990) has held; "Generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been 
found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error". This Court further observed, 
"In such cases, the court will reach the issue on appeal despite the lack of 
objection". (Id. at 821). See also United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th 
Cir. 1987). In the present case, the inquiry into the area of the DCFS custody of 
the children should fall into that same category. These details should be so 
prejudicial as to amount to plain error. 
4
 References made in the Record 074: 2 times on page 83, again on page 88, and 5 
times on page 91. 
5
 The prosecutor argues that somehow this evidence goes to show the inability of 
the witness Sherry Richards to properly observe and remember the events on that 
day. 
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If this Court finds that the trial court committed error in its ruling on the 
admissibility of this evidence, the court must then determine whether or not that 
error was harmful. The harmful nature of this evidence appears obvious but is 
highlighted by the numerous attempts it was used by the prosecutor to prejudice 
the jury against the defendant. One of the most telling examples of this attempt to 
prejudice the jury is during the rebuttal argument of the prosecutor where the 
prosecutor asks the jury "Let's see what we can infer about her testimony there. 
They don't park at the DCFS building; they park a block and a half, two blocks 
away at least. And they're there for a visit with the children." (R. 074/ pg91 
emphasis added) The error is harmful, and the effects were calculated. The 
evidence of knowledge of possession of the residue was circumstantial and any 
evidence that goes toward biasing the jury toward the defendant had to have an 
effect on the outcome of their deliberations. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT, SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE REGARDING AN 
ALLEGED THEFT OF A MUSTANG VEHICLE? 
On numerous occasions throughout the trial, the prosecutor elicited 
testimony regarding a stolen Ford Mustang vehicle. The witnesses infer throughout 
their testimony and the prosecutor accuses in his closing, that the defendant had 
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some involvement in this theft6. This issue is only objected to on one occasion late 
in the trial and therefore the defense concedes that they must establish plain error 
to prevail on this point. 
"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact 
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 
(Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not 
reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both 
obvious and harmful". The Court further ruled "An error is harmful if the 
likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.'" (Id at 1010/ This Court, in the case of State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 
821 (Utah App. 1990) has held; "Generally, inquiry into the details of prior 
convictions has been found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error". This 
Court further observed, "In such cases, the court will reach the issue on appeal 
despite the lack of objection". (Id. at 821). See also United States v. Roenigk, 810 
F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987). 
6
 In spite of the fact that the prosecutor acknowledges at the outset that the 
defendant was not charged with this theft, he refers to the theft on dozens of 
occasions and in closing asks the jury to infer his involvement in the theft from the 
fact that he parks 2 blocks away from the DCFS building.(R. 074/ pg 91) 
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In the present case, Officer Draper continually refers to the defendant as the 
suspect in the Mustang theft, and the prosecutor continues to reference the stolen 
Mustang. The prejudicial effect of these references is enormous. Not only does the 
one witness continually refer to the defendant as the suspect, he details his 
detention of the defendant for purposes of questioning by Officer Pickrell who was 
"currently work[ing] major crimes, primarily auto thefts". (R. 074/ pgll) The 
prosecutor elicits testimony from several witnesses concerning the defendant 
parking two (2) or more blocks away from their destination inferring an attempt to 
hide the stolen vehicle. He further asks the jury in closing argument, "Let's see 
what we can infer about her testimony there. They don't park at the DCFS 
building; they park a block and a half, two blocks away at least." (R. 074/ pg91 
emphasis added) 
POINT III 
DID THE ELICITATION OF OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 
AND THE COMMENTING ON THAT EVIDENCE DURING 
OPENING AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS CONSTITUTE 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT? 
In the recent case of State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the rule governing reversal in the event of prosecutorial misconduct. In 
that case the Court held: 
We will reverse a jury verdict because of prosecutorial misconduct if 
we find the prosecutor's remarks were improper and harmful to 
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defendant. State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000); (Citing also 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986)). 
In determining when a prosecutor crosses the line, the court stated that a 
prosecutor's remarks will be considered improper if the remarks "called to the 
juror's attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching a verdict." State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (quoting State 
v. Johnson, 663 P.2d48, 51 (Utah 1983)). 
In the case of State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 957 (Utah 1999) the court 
declared, 
"It is fundamental in our law that a person may be convicted 
criminally only for his act, not for his general character. That principle 
is violated if a conviction is based on an inference that conviction is 
justified because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to 
commit bad acts" 
In State v. Saunders the defendant made a pretrial motion in limine to 
exclude alleged preinformation misconduct of a similar nature. The court allowed 
questions but not details about this misconduct. Despite the fact that the issue was 
not properly preserved for appeal, the court stated, 
[We] hold that the trial court's pretrial order was patently erroneous as 
to general evidence of prior misconduct under the plain error doctrine 
and highly prejudicial. {Id. at 958 emphasis added) 
The Court in State v. Saunders reversed and remanded the verdict on 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct among other things.(7tf. at 960) 
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The next prong of the test is to determine if the improper remarks or actions 
of the prosecutor were "harmful to the defendant." The Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 1984) held: "Improper remarks will 
be deemed harmful if the jury was, "under the circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks." (quoting State v. Valdez, 523 P.2d 422, 426 
(1973); see also State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000) (stating prosecutor's 
statements harmful if they manifest error that "is substantial and prejudicial such 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a 
more favorable result."" (quoting State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1998))). 
The United States Supreme Court has likewise held that when a prosecutor 
crosses the line of advocacy into an area of unfairness, a criminal defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. In the case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 
S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) the Court held: 
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. 
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to 
bring about a just one." 
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In the case at bar, the prosecutor, on numerous occasions struck foul blows. 
The prosecutors misconduct in this trial is established by virtue of the staggering 
number of improper references7, as well as the total lack of relevance any of these 
references have to the elements of the offense. The prosecutor admits the 
irrelevance of the Mustang at the outset when he told the jury "But don't worry 
about the 1989 Ford Mustang. It was recovered and, in fact, the defendant hasn't 
been charged or anything in conjunction with that." (R. 074/ pg 7) Nevertheless, 
the prosecutor elicited testimony concerning the Mustang on numerous occasions, 
and then mentioned the Mustang or circumstances surrounding the Mustang on no 
fewer than 6 occasions in his opening and closing arguments. 
The prosecutor mentions DCFS so many times that it becomes a recurring 
theme throughout the trial. He inquired into the reason the children were being 
visited at DCFS, which was objected to and sustained by the trial judge (however 
the testimony was not ever stricken nor was a curative instruction given)(R074/ pg 
*7 
This trial was short by any measure, consisting of merely 87 pages of transcript 
from opening statement through closing statement. Reference was made by the 
prosecutor to the stolen mustang, to DCFS, or to the defendant's homeless status 
on 28 of those pages, which calculates to over 32% of the total trial time. 
Reference is made by the defense attorney on an additional 6 pages, mostly in an 
attempt to explain away the inferences made by the prosecutor. With those 
additional references, a total of 34 pages of the transcript referred to these 
extraneous matters. Pages of the references are as follows: 6,7,8,11,12,13,14,15, 
17,18,28,31,33,37,38,39,41,67,68,69,707174,75,76,77,78,82.83.85.86.88.91.92. 
(underlined pages are references made by the defense) 
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70) Even in the face of that ruling, the prosecutors next question was "You said 
that you'd gone to DCFS...."(R074/pg70). 
Finally, the prosecutor inquired into the homeless or transient status of the 
defendant over the objection of defense counsel. The trial judge, without record 
allowed this inquiry. There is never any legitimate reason set forth for this line of 
questions, and the record is devoid of any attempt to show its relevance. 
The harm to the defendant as a result of questioning in these areas is 
obvious. The jury is left to deliberate having been improperly prejudiced as to the 
defendant's character. Even though the evidence of possession is relatively strong, 
the element of intent or knowledge is a jury question that can easily be influenced 
by this type of prejudicial posturing. In the case of State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 
(Utah 1983) the Court found that the prosecutors reference to the defendant's 
receiving income while on social security as "double dipping" and "a cancer on 
society", signing paychecks as "forging of signatures" and "filing for bankruptcy 
as an indication of dishonesty" constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The court in 
Johnson stated, "Under the circumstances of this case, there is no doubt that the 
prosecutor's 'remarks called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not 
be justified in considering . . . [and that they] were probably influenced by the 
remarks.'" (Id. at 51) The Court ruled that the prosecutor's conduct was improper, 
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and would have constituted grounds for a new trial if they had not reversed the 
convictions for insufficiency of the evidence. 
In the present case, the prosecutor employed "improper methods calculated 
to produce a wrongful conviction." (Berger v. United States infra.) The result was 
repeatedly calling "to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be 
justified in considering." (State v. Johnson infra.) And like the Court in Johnson, it 
is reasonable to infer that the jurors' deliberations and decision were probably 
influenced by the almost continuous improper references. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests this court 
reverse the defendant's conviction and remand 
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